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Abstract
Quasi-truth (a.k.a. pragmatic truth or partial truth) is typically ad-
vanced as a framework accounting for incompleteness and uncertainty in
the actual practices of science. Also, it is said to be useful for accommo-
dating cases of inconsistency in science without leading to triviality. In
this paper, we argue that the given developments do not deliver all that is
promised. We examine the most prominent account of quasi-truth avail-
able in the literature, advanced by da Costa and collaborators in many
places, and argue that it cannot legitimately account for incompleteness in
science: we shall claim that it conflates paraconsistency and paracomplete-
ness. It also cannot account for inconsistencies, because no direct contra-
diction of the form α ∧ ¬α can be quasi-true, according to the framework.
Finally, we advance an alternative interpretation of the formalism in terms
of dealing with distinct contexts where incompatible information is dealt
with. This does not save the original program, but seems to make better
sense of the formalism.
Keywords: quasi-truth; pragmatic theories of truth; paraconsistency; in-
completeness.
1 Introduction
Scientific theories and scientific knowledge, in general, may be said to be de-
fective in a multitude of ways. Our abilities to generate knowledge are known
to be less than perfect, and we are frequently found to be holding mistaken
views about the nature of reality. Of course, science itself is self-correcting, but
even the optimistic hopes for a final correct and true theory cannot avoid the
fact that our situation is less than perfect on what concerns our actual theories.
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One of the senses in which current science is defective concerns the fact that
it is not complete in an important sense. There is much that still needs to be in-
vestigated, many open questions, and many tentative claims and theories that
are not known to be true, or that are certainly false. It seems that a framework
able to deal with such situations must accommodate this kind of incomplete-
ness or openness of current knowledge. As da Costa and French [8, pp.13-14]
put it, considering the possibility that there is an ideal limit to which scientific
knowledge may converge,
If the final conception is taken to be complete or total, then our con-
ception at any given time prior to the realization of this limit may
be said to be partial. And because it is, at any given time, partial,
it is, at that time, open in the sense that it may be completable in a
variety of ways.
Philosophically, this incompleteness is thought of as challenging because
most of our accounts of scientific theories rely on classical apparatuses that
cannot straightforwardly be said to accommodate incomplete knowledge. In
a nutshell, the semantic view of scientific theories, for instance, which is taken
by many to be the current orthodoxy, regards scientific theories as classes of set
theoretical structures (see Krause and Arenhart [14]). These structures, on their
turn, are total, not partial, in the sense that relations and properties in them are
always defined for every entity in the domain of the structure; no openness or
incompleteness allowed. This brings some trouble when it comes to discuss
the appropriate epistemic attitude towards such theories, given that they are
treated as either completely true or else completely false. It is a matter of all or
nothing, it seems.
There is, however, an alternative framework that was advanced precisely
in order to deal with these situations: the concept of pragmatic truth or quasi-
truth, as introduced by Mikenberg, da Costa, and Chuaqui [15]. The account
was further explored by da Costa and French [8], among many others. As da
Costa and French [8, p.14] put it, the framework was advanced precisely to
model the current situation in science, because “[i]t is precisely this sense of
partiality and openness that our account attempts to capture and further ex-
plore”. Pragmatic truth, then, promises to account for incomplete information
in science, with the benefits that are expected to result from such a more realis-
tic characterization of science.
However, there is more than that in pragmatic truth. The view is said to
deal with another kind of defective situation in science: the ones involving
contradictions. As Bueno and da Costa [5, p.385] claim, an account of scientific
rationality must explain how is it possible that scientists entertain inconsistent
theories. That inconsistent theories have been frequently entertained is typi-
cally argued for by the presentation of examples of theories that were indeed
entertained, and were found out to be inconsistent: the early formulation of
the calculus, Bohr’s atomic model, Frege’s original logicist reconstruction of
arithmetic, naive set theory, quantum mechanics and general theory of relativ-
ity (taken together), to mention a few. Again, the major problem consists in
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explaining our epistemic attitude towards such theories, and also accounting
for their apparent non-triviality. Now, pragmatic truth is said to accommo-
date also cases of inconsistency in science without entailing triviality (Bueno
[4, p.275]; da Costa and French [8, chap.5]; Bueno and da Costa [5, p.392]).
Inconsistent theories may be quasi-true in a sense, without logically implying
everything. That makes of quasi-truth a nice tool for philosophers to approach
current science, no?
In this paper, we shall argue that quasi-truth falls short of delivering what
is promised. Basically, our claim is that defective situations in science such
as incompleteness and inconsistency cannot be clearly accounted for by the
use of the conceptual tools provided by the notion of pragmatic truth. The
view fails in providing the appropriate views of incompleteness and also of
inconsistency. More than that, it conflates inconsistency and incompleteness,
which are clearly distinct phenomena when it comes to knowledge and infor-
mation. The source of such problems, we argue, comes basically from a much
liberal use of the concept of quasi-truth, which in most informal uses of the
conceptual framework in hand simply ignore the restrictions to a given struc-
ture. Once it is recalled that a sentence may be quasi-true in a total structure
relatively to a given partial structure, then, a weaker reading of quasi-truth may
be provided for. This weaker reading does not do everything that quasi-truth
was expected to do by its proponents, but it does a better job in making sense
of the formalism.
The paper is structured as follows. In section 2 we recover the formalism
of pragmatic truth as it is typically presented by da Costa and collaborators.
We then present in section 3 the main problems for the view, and how it is
found wanting on its own terms. One of the diagnosis of what has gone wrong
is that the formalism has conflated paraconsistency and paracompleteness; it
attempts to capture incomplete knowledge with contradictions. In section 4,
we argue that the original formalism by da Costa may be open for a distinct,
pragmatic interpretation that is better suited for its purposes. The account no
longer accounts for contradictions, but it is closer to what the formalism origi-
nally introduced actually does. We conclude in section 5.
2 Quasi-truth: the basic definitions
Let us begin by reviewing the basic concepts of the first kind of definition of
quasi-truth or pragmatic truth. Basically, this kind of approach requires a de-
tour through the Tarskian definition of truth, so that this notion plays a central
role (and this will be important for our discussion).
When investigating a domain of knowledge ∆, we formulate a conceptual
scheme in order to deal with the entities in this domain and their relations. This
requires setting a set D, the domain of entities, which may have as elements
both concrete entities, such as tracks in a cloud chamber, as well as non-directly
observable posits of our theories, such as quarks and strings. Accounting for
the behavior of these entities also involves devising a family K of relations
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and properties that hold for these entities, on which we are interested in. This
will give rise to a set theoretical structure A = 〈D, Rk〉k∈K (we use standard
Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory with the axiom of choice in the metalanguage).
In classical structures (that is, structures in classical model theory), we typi-
cally define each Rk as being a total relation, that is, if Rk is an n-ary relation, for
each n-tuple of elements of D, either Rk holds of this n-tuple, or else it doesn’t;
no further options available. In science, however, there are situations in which
our knowledge about the entities in D and the relations Rk is incomplete, so
that it may not be completely clear whether some n-tuple holds of Rk or not.
That is, the relation Rk is only partially defined, because for some n-tuples it is
left open whether they are related by Rk or not. The concept of partial relation
was devised precisely to accommodate such cases of incomplete information.
In formal terms, a partial n-ary relation R over D is defined as a triple R =
〈R1, R2, R3〉 of sets of n-tuples of elements of D such that these three sets are
mutually disjoint and their union is Dn (that is, the sets are mutually exclusive
and jointly exhaustive of Dn). The explanations for the division are typically
framed in terms of our lack of knowledge or lack of definition (as we did in
the previous paragraph): R1 is the set of n-tuples of elements of D for which
we know that R holds, R2 is the set of n-tuples of which we know not to hold of
R, and R3 is the set of n-tuples for which we do not know whether they are R-
related or not (see Bueno [4, p.279]). Other times, the triple division in a partial
relation is explained not in epistemic terms, but in terms of ‘definition’, so that
“R1 is the set of n-tuples that belong to R, R2 is the set of n-tuples that do not
belong to R, and R3 is the set of n-tuples for which it is not defined whether
they belong or not to R” (Bueno [4, p.279], see also da Costa and French [8,
p.18]). Sometimes, the idea is further explained as follows (for binary relations,
where A is used as the domain set):
R1 is the set of ordered pairs which are satisfied by those sentences
expressing the relationship between the entities concerned, R2 is
the set of ordered pairs not satisfied by these sentences, and R3 is
the set of ordered pairs for which it is left open whether they are
satisfied . . . It is precisely this which is meant when we say that Rk
is “not necessarily defined for all nk-tuples of elements of A” (da
Costa and French [8, p.19])
That is, a relation ‘not being defined’ for some n-tuples is thought to be ‘pre-
cisely’ explained in terms of a relation being ‘left open’ for those entities. Our
point is that such characterizations are not clearly equivalent, given that they
vary from epistemic to semantic. The intuitive interpretation that is expected
to be captured by the formalism is important, however, because it reveals the
intended meaning conferred to the third component of a partial relation, and
because it is thought that it is precisely this component which accounts for the
incompleteness of scientific knowledge.
A partial structure is a structure A = 〈D, Rk〉k∈K, where D is the domain
of the structure and Rk is a family of partial relations over D. But that is not
enough. We also need to enrich partial structures with a set P of sentences of
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the language to be interpreted in the partial structure (a language of the same
similarity type as that of the structure), sentences to be accepted as true in the
Tarskian sense. Which sentences are to be found in P? It all depends on which
sentences of the theory one is wiling to countenance as true in the classical,
Tarskian sense. Empiricists may be willing to accept as true only empirically
decidable sentences, describing the results of experiments; scientific realists
may go a step further and include in P statements or laws about unobserv-
able entities. The resulting structure 〈D, Rk,P〉k∈K is called a simple pragmatic
structure.
The rationale behind the introduction of P is simple. Given a partial struc-
ture A, and a partial n-ary relation R, for any n-tuple ~x = 〈x1, . . . xn〉 of ele-
ments of D, if ~x is in R3, we may extend R in two directions: according to one
extension, ~x is in R1, or, according to another extension, ~x is in R2. That pro-
vides for too many extensions of a structure, given that this process may be
repeated for each n-tuple and for each relation in the structure. In pragmatic
structures, then, the role of P is to limit the number of extensions: “P intro-
duces constraints on the ways that a partial structure can be extended” (Bueno
and da Costa [5, p.388]). The idea is that an extension makes for a completion
of the relations leading to a complete structure, and that these extensions are
allowed only in the cases where they are consistent with the sentences in P.
Now, we are almost ready to define quasi-truth. In order to do that, we
need the concept of a A-normal structure, which is complete or total structure
associated with a partial structure A, in which the notion of truth is just the
classical, Tarskian notion.
Given a first-order language £ of the same similarity type as of that of a
simple pragmatic structure A = 〈D, Rk,P〉k∈K, in which £ is interpreted, and
a simple pragmatic structure B = 〈D′, R′k,P〉k∈K, we say B is an A-normal
structure if (notice that the set P is the same in both structures):
i) D = D′,
ii) every constant in the language is interpreted in the same object in both A
and B,
iii) R′k extends the corresponding Rk for a total relation,
iv) B is a model of P, in the sense of Tarski.
A sentence S is quasi-true in A according to B iff
i) A = 〈D, Rk,P〉k∈K is a simple pragmatic structure,
ii) B = 〈D′, R′k,P〉 is an A-normal structure,
iii) S is true in B in the Tarskian sense.
If S is not quasi-true in A according to B, then S is quasi-false in A according to
B.
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Also, S is quasi-true in A if there is an A-normal structure B such that S is
quasi-true in A according to B. Otherwise, S is quasi-false in A.
Notice that there are two related concepts of quasi-truth being defined:
(I) a sentence S is quasi-true in a structure A according toB (and quasi-false
in A according to B), and
(II) a sentence S is quasi-true in A (no direct mention of which B is being
considered).
Bueno introduces a further definition
(III) “we say that a sentence S is quasi-true if there is a partial structure A and
a corresponding A-normal structureB such that S is true inB (according
to Tarski’s account). Otherwise, S is quasi-false” (Bueno [4, p.280], with
notation adapted for the sake of uniformity).
Notice the differences between the three cases. In (I), a sentence S may be
quasi-true in A according to B, but ¬S cannot be quasi-true in A according to
B, because B is a Tarskian classical structure. In (II), S and ¬S may be quasi-
true according to A, it just requires that S is quasi-true according to a given total
structure B, and ¬S is quasi-true according to a distinct total structure C. This
seems to allow for a contradiction (more on this soon). The definition (III) in-
troduces a predicate of quasi-truth simpliciter, not relative to any specific struc-
ture. As a result, notice, a sentence S may be quasi-true, with its negation ¬S
also quasi-true: S may be quasi-true because it is quasi-true in a given partial
structure A, and ¬S may be quasi-true because it is quasi-true in another partial
structure B.
As a result, we have two notions of quasi-truth in a model (I and II), and
a notion of quasi-truth which does not mention any model (III). The fact that
there are three concepts invites confusion when it comes to discuss the idea
that partial structures capture incompleteness and contradictions in science.
One must always keep in mind which of these three definitions of quasi-truth
one is talking about in discussing the prospects of quasi-truth and whether it
achieves its goals. Let us do that now.
3 Discussion
3.1 Partiality and incompleteness
Once these definitions are in order, let us check how that apparatus is supposed
to deal with incompleteness and inconsistency. We begin with incompleteness
and partiality, but this is directly related with inconsistency, as we shall see.
According to da Costa and French [8, p.19] “the incomplete and imperfect na-
ture of the majority of our representations of the world is, we claim, repre-
sented by the simple pragmatic structures just provided”. That is, the hope is
that pragmatic structures somehow accommodate incomplete knowledge by
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the fact that some relations are partial, which lead to quasi-truth, and not the
whole truth. However, that the partial structures approach does indeed cap-
ture such incompleteness is something that must be argued for, and not just
claimed. Let us try to enlighten this issue.
Let us begin by following how Bueno and da Costa [5, p.388] describe the
workings of the partial truth conceptual machinery in order to capture partial-
ity and incompleteness. Intuitively, they claim, the idea is that a quasi-true
sentence does not describe the whole domain to which it refers to, but only an
aspect of it, the aspect modelled by the relevant partial structure. The explana-
tion for this: there are different ways a partial structure may be extended, and
in some of them the target sentence may be true, in others false. Incomplete-
ness means, then, that completion of the partial relations may be performed in
distinct, incompatible, ways.
To begin with, notice that there seems to be two (somehow incompatible)
claims about incompleteness here: first, that a quasi-true sentence is model of
a partial part of the domain, not of the whole of it. Second, that incompleteness
is accommodated in the account by the possibility of distinct incompatible ex-
tensions of the partial relations. Let us check these claims.
The first claim is easier to deal with. The idea seems to be that a quasi-true
sentence accommodates partiality because it models only the aspects of the
domain that are known or defined, not the undefined or unknown parts. That
is, given a partial structure A, a sentence involving a relation symbol R inter-
preted in 〈R1, R2, R3〉 describes only the behavior of those entities for which it
is defined that the entities are in the corresponding R1 or in R2. The behavior
of the entities in R3 is not accounted for by the sentence, because their status
is unknown or undefined. If this is what is being claimed, then, notice, that
this is far from incomplete or uncertain. That is, the aspects being said to be
modelled by the sentence are precisely the well-known, well-defined aspects
of the structure. The sentence is a complete description of the part that can-
not change. So, it cannot be claimed that partial truth is partial because of this
aspect of the model.
This kind of certainty also spreads to some of the entities that are in the R3
part of an interpretation of a relation symbol R, in some cases. Notice that it
may well be the case that, once the set P of sentences is added to the partial
structure, then, the sentences in P constrain the A-normal structures in such a
way that, for some partial relations R, the elements of R3 may not be allowed
to be extended consistently both to R1 in some of them, and to R2 in others.
In that case, there is only one kind of extension for R consistent with P, and
this is no longer a legitimate case incomplete knowledge. That is, there are
some situations in which P adds constraints to the structure so that part of the
incompleteness goes away.
So, the specific partiality and incompleteness that quasi-truth and partial
structures are said to capture cannot concern the well-defined, well-known as-
pects of the relations and properties. There is nothing uncertain or partial there.
In other words: in cases where we are dealing with a sentence that is not con-
cerned with entities in the R3 part of the model, our knowledge is not partial
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or incomplete. Suppose we are interested in a relation R in a partial structure
A, and we speak about an n-tuple which lies in R1 or in R2. Then, the corre-
sponding sentence is true or false in any A-normal structure extending A. No
uncertainty or incompleteness is involved here.
Let us focus on the second claim above, viz. the one to the effect that partial-
ity is accounted for in those cases where it is left open that, for some A-normal
structures, an n-tuple in R3 is extended to R1, and in another A-normal struc-
ture, to R2. Is it a good representation of a case of incomplete knowledge? Is
incompleteness accounted for in the formal apparatus provided for?
To make our discussion simpler, and without losing generality, let us re-
strict ourselves to the case of a predicate symbol P, interpreted in a pragmatic
structure A as PA = 〈P1, P2, P3〉, and a single element x in the corresponding
P3, which is the denotation of an individua constant a. It seems that the claim
that our knowledge of whether the corresponding sentence Pa is the case is
uncertain is due to the fact that one may have an A-normal structure where the
corresponding sentence Pa is quasi-true, and another, where ¬Pa is quasi-true.
We just don’t know which one is the structure describing reality correctly. So,
we have incomplete information, it is said.
But now, let us consider whether that really represents a case of incomplete
knowledge or lack of information in the formal apparatus just presented. We
begin by considering the definition of quasi-truth given in (I). The plan seems
to be as follows: the incompleteness is represented in terms of the lack of pos-
sibility or knowledge to determine which, among at least two incompatible
A-normal structures, are to be chosen. We know that Pa is quasi-true in an A-
normal structure B, and we also know that ¬Pa is quasi-true in an A-normal
structure C, but we don’t know which one is to be taken as a representation
of reality; this reflects our epistemic situation of uncertainty and incomplete
information, and this is represented in the framework by the fact that we have
statements “Pa is quasi-true in A according to B” and “¬Pa is quasi-true in A
according to C”.
However, if that is what is being taken to be a representation of incomplete
or partial knowledge, then it is not easy to see that putting the problem in terms
of quasi-truth has any advantage over classical logic. The classical logician
could put the same situation in the same terms: we know that the sentence Pa
is true (in the Tarskian sense) in a total structureB, and that ¬Pa is true (idem)
in a total structure C. We just don’t know which is the case, i.e. which of the
structures should be chosen or adopted. Then, the situations of uncertainty
or incompleteness as described by quasi-truth (according to definition (I)) and
classical logic are completely parallel. There is nothing essentially different in
the classical case and in the quasi-true case. Then, it could be claimed, classical
logic also models our incomplete information!
But that would be going too far. It is preferable to claim that quasi-truth
fails to account for incomplete knowledge under definition (I). Certainly, the
problem is that the uncertainty or incompleteness is not represented inside the
model or conceptual apparatus of quasi-truth, when the definition of quasi-
truth is stated in terms of definition (I), because that definition leads us to the
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problem of choosing a classical, Tarskian, structure, which is a problem the
classical logician also faces. The diagnosis for that may be put as follows: typ-
ically, lack of knowledge is represented inside a framework by a failure of the
law of excluded middle (LEM), either in its syntactical formulation, viz. α∨¬α,
or else in a semantical formulation, stating that a sentence and its negation can-
not both be false. One could hope that, if our knowledge of whether P holds
for a in A is uncertain, then, neither Pa nor ¬Pa is the case in the model. That
is, LEM, in some version of it, should fail in some cases. That is typically how
lack of information is accounted for. However, Pa ∨ ¬Pa is quasi-true in every
pragmatic structure A in relation to any A-normal structure (quasi-true accord-
ing to definition (I)). Also, Pa ∨ ¬Pa is quasi-true in any pragmatic structure
A (definition II). Finally, this sentence is also quasi-true in the third sense (III),
defined by Bueno, above. Other versions of the LEM are also valid: it is the
case that for any A-normal structure, Pa is quasi-true, or else ¬Pa is quasi-true.
In semantic terms: for each A-normal structure, Pa is quasi-true or quasi-false.
How can that accommodate incompleteness? The incompleteness is only ac-
counted for outside of the model, in the terms we have already explained: we
don’t know which A-normal structure should be chosen, the one in which Pa is
true, or the one in which ¬Pa is true. But that problem is also available for the
classical logician, and if that kind of problem represents incompleteness, then,
the classical logician can also ‘represent’ such situations.
Perhaps the idea that one may represent incomplete information is better
represented by definitions (II) and (III) of partial truth. It could be claimed
that they represent incomplete information inside the model by allowing in-
consistent sentences to be both quasi-true. For the definition (II) (quasi-truth
in a pragmatic structure A), it is possible to say that, in cases of elements x of
P3,1 both Pa and ¬Pa quasi-true in a pragmatic structure A. For (III), one ends
up being able to say that both Pa and ¬Pa are quasi-true tout court. Then, for
every case where information is claimed to be lacking, one ends up discov-
ering that both a sentence and it negation are quasi-true, either in the same
partial structure (definition II), or else just quasi-true in distinct partial struc-
tures (definition III). This, it could be claimed, represents the incompleteness
of information.
It seems da Costa and French are really willing to buy into that ambigu-
ity between incompleteness and inconsistency. Regarding the Bohr model of
the atom, which delivered inconsistencies by selectively applying fragments of
classical mechanics and Planck’s formula, they claim:
Structurally, these were both inconsistent and incomplete in that
with the inconsistency we do not know whether the relevant prop-
erties and relations hold in the domain or not . . . this openness or
lack of closure . . . is representable model theoretically by a partial
structure. (da Costa and French [8, p.105])
That is, incompleteness is present because there is inconsistency. However,
1We are still restricting our discussion to the case of a single predicate letter P.
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that is again a bad idea. According to this explanation, every incomplete rela-
tion generates a kind of contradictory information, in the sense that we have
in fact overabundant information, not lack of information. If this is the repre-
sentation inside the partial structures approach of incomplete and uncertain
information, then, it seems, it misses the target by providing a representation
of cases where we have in fact a lot of information. It confuses cases where
we have gaps (lack of truth value) with cases where we have gluts (abundance
of truth values). These must be distinguished, because they give rise to dis-
tinct kinds of treatments. To wit, systems of logic such as FDE2 may be seen
as having a four-valued functional semantics, with gaps and gluts clearly dis-
tinguished. Even those who prefer to deal with inconsistency in more epis-
temic terms, not in terms of truth values, as Carnielli and Rodrigues [6], hold
that incompleteness of information and inconsistent information are distinct
phenomena. Incompleteness must be accounted for by paracompleteness, not
by paraconsistency. Incompatible evidence generates some kind of paraconsis-
tency. Violation of a version of the law of non-contradiction (LNC) is the wrong
way to represent lack of information; in these cases, it is LEM that should be
violated.
Notice also that if such inconsistency as saying that Pa is quasi-true and that
¬Pa is also quasi-true represents incomplete information, then, according to
the definition (III) above, the classical logician also has the resources to express
this kind of incompleteness. Clearly, for most sentences α (except for logical
validities and logical falsities), there is a classical structure which makes α true,
and another structure which makes ¬α true. Then, classical logic would also
be able to express the same situation. But that simply shows that the account,
following definition (III), is inadequate.
In order to avoid such direct conflation between inconsistency and incom-
pleteness, one could claim that definition (II) really leads us back to definition
(I), given that it is presented in terms of (I), and making the definitions ex-
plicit we see that there is no real contradiction, but a kind of uncertainty over
which normal structure to choose. This avoids confusing inconsistency and
incompleteness, but then the claim that we have incomplete knowledge just
comes back to the claim that we are uncertain about which A-normal structure
to choose, and that is just the same situation as in classical logic, as we have
already argued.
So, our preliminary conclusions may be stated as follows: in the case of
definition (I) of quasi-truth, there is no representation of incomplete knowledge
inside the framework, and there is no progress over classical logic; in the case
of definitions (II) and (III), the representation is inadequate, because it models
overabundant information by contradictory sentences being quasi-true; (III)
also has the disadvantage of being excessively general, so that if this kind of
definition is allowed to account for incomplete knowledge, then classical logic
may also represent incomplete knowledge.
2First-degree entailment; see Priest [17, chap.8].
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3.2 Inconsistency
This leads us to the treatment of inconsistency by the apparatus of pragmatic
truth. We have already seen that quasi-truth leads to some kinds of contra-
dictions, with both a sentence and its negation being quasi-true in some struc-
tures. Perhaps it is this that da Costa and French [8, p.85], have in mind when
claiming that “we offer a model theoretic account in which regarding theories
in terms of partial structures offers a straightforward and natural way of ac-
commodating inconsistency”.
In order for us to check whether this claim holds good of the pragmatic
truth approach, we must first make clear what kind of contradiction or incon-
sistency is being dealt with here. As Priest [16, p.144] has remarked, there are
at least three types of inconsistency in empirical science:
i) inconsistency between theory and observation,
ii) inconsistency between theories,
iii) inconsistency internal to the theory.
The case i), inconsistency between theory and observation, is probably not
the case one is aiming at with quasi-truth. No one really wants to accommo-
date such cases. In these circumstances, when observation contradicts the pre-
visions of a theory, one typically revise the theory, or else provides for an ex-
planation that accounts for the incompatibility, showing that what was once
perceived as a conflict between theory and observation is not really so. For
instance, the orbit of Uranus was not in complete agreement with Newtonian
theory; however, the discrepancy was later explained with the discovery of
Neptune. What matters for us here is that quasi-truth adds no special ingre-
dient on the relation between theory and observation. Sentences of the theory
are quasi-true or quasi-false, and their relation to observation is accounted for
empirically, not by the apparatus of the framework.
Case ii) is also not a case to be dealt with by quasi-truth, although some
examples of this kind of inconsistency have been used to motivate quasi-truth
(as the case of the incompatibility between quantum mechanics and general
relativity, one of the most mentioned examples of inconsistency in science).
In this situation, distinct theories are considered, not the same theory. The
contradiction comes from distinct sources, and the problem is not a matter of
extending the same structure in distinct ways, but of unification of theories.
Then, quasi-truth is of no help here.
The only case that quasi-truth could really account for is case iii), internal
contradictions. However, it seems that quasi-truth is not the correct tool for
that too. As Bueno and da Costa [5, p.390] remark (with notation modified for
the same of uniformity with the one employed in this paper):
An important feature to note here is that a sentence and its nega-
tion can be both quasi-true. Of course, inconsistent sentences are
not quasi-true in the same A-normal structure, but they can still be
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both quasi-true — as long as they are true in some A-normal struc-
ture. In other words, as defined above, if a theory is quasi-true, it is
consistent (given that it is true in some full A-normal structure).
This remark is confusing on what concerns the distinct notions of quasi-
truth involved. Remember: when it comes to definition (I), a sentence α cannot
be quasi-true in a pragmatic structure A relative to a A-normal structure B
with its negation be quasi-true in the same A-normal structure B. In relation to
definition (II), however, α and¬α may be both quasi-true in the same pragmatic
structure (because they are true in distinct A-normal structures). In relation
to (III), α and ¬α may be both quasi-true, each in its own structure, and with
distinct structures for each sentence, of course (not being inconsistent or logical
validities, there are structures modeling them).
However, despite the lack of specification, the above quote seems to put
quasi-true contradictions in the correct perspective. As Bueno [4, p.281] in-
dicates, if we use Q as a predicate of sentences indicating quasi-truth, we
may have Q(α) ∧ Q(¬α) (in definitions II and III), however, we do not have
Q(α ∧ ¬α) (and this holds for the three definitions of quasi-truth). The first in-
dicates merely that a pragmatic structure A may be extended in incompatible
ways, so that in a A-normal structure B it may be the case that α is quasi-
true, while in another A-normal structure C, ¬α is the case. A quasi-true sen-
tence is consistent, in the classical sense. The idea that contradictions can be
accommodated in the quasi-truth apparatus comes from ignoring that a sen-
tence and its negation are quasi-true in distinct A-normal structures. However,
Q(α ∧ ¬α) cannot be the case, because no A-normal structure models a contra-
diction; they are Tarskian, classical structures. Then, if a theory provides for
a sentence α ∧ ¬α, there is no hope of accommodating it in the apparatus of
pragmatic truth.
But that means that the quasi-truth framework cannot really accommodate
inconsistencies. On the one hand, a contradiction of the form α ∧ ¬α is never
quasi-true, and this is precisely the kind of inconsistency one finds in cases
of theories internally inconsistent. On the other hand, it is an exaggeration
to claim that Q(α) and Q(¬α) is a contradiction, or lead to a contradiction.
Both are true according to different A-normal structures.3 It is easy to introduce
parameters to account for the apparent incompatibility: α is true according to
an A-normal structureB, and ¬α is true according to an A-normal structure C.
A legitimate contradiction would require Q(α∧¬α) or Q(S)∧¬Q(α). The first
case is not allowed for, as we have already commented. Q(α) ∧ ¬Q(α) is also
not possible. Given that the metalanguage is classical, ¬Q(α) means that α is
not quasi-true, that is, α is quasi-false, in a given A-normal structure. However,
no sentence can be quasi-true and quasi-false in the same A-normal structure.
That is, the apparatus of quasi-truth fails in accommodating inconsistencies.
3As we shall discuss in section 4, this may be interesting indeed for it seems to accommodate
typical “Bohrian” complementary situations, where we need to have both situations in order to
fully understand a phenomenon (say the particle and the wave behaviour of matter), but they
cannot be taken together in a same situation. See also [9].
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However, Bueno and da Costa seem to acknowledge that limitation, and
attempt to overcome it. As they claim [5, p.390]: “But in some contexts, we may
need to assert that an inconsistent theory is quasi-true. How can we do that?”
That is, it is recognized that one cannot have a contradiction being quasi-true,
but, anyway, some inconsistent theories (in the sense of internal inconsistency)
should be said to be quasi-true. Bueno and da Costa present a solution to the
problem that, curiously, does not require that we admit a contradiction α ∧ ¬α
as quasi-true. Their solution to the problem, however, is presented in a very
informal way (again, adapting the notation):
If a theory T is inconsistent, we say that T is quasi-true in a partial
structure A if there are “strong” subsets of T′s theorems that are
true in some A-normal structure. (Bueno and da Costa [5, p.390])
The plan is explained as follows: one just selects consistent “strong” sub-
sets of T′s theorems and check for some A-normal (that is, complete, Tarskian)
structure that satisfies them. The idea of “strong” subsets of theorems is to
be understood pragmatically, but that only adds to the mystery, of course. As
an instance ([5, p.391]), they discuss the case of naive set theory, which clearly
derives a contradiction as one of its theorems (Russell’s paradox, let us say).
Select a consistent set P of restrictions (the unproblematic postulates, union
axiom, power set axiom, and so on), and let membership be the only partial
relation of the structure. This membership relation, it is said, may be extended
in distinct ways, provided that they are consistent with P. They claim then, for
instance, that the membership relation may be extended to obtain ZFC, or to
obtain Quine’s NF or ML, or to obtain von Neumann-Bernays-Gödel set the-
ory (NBG) ([5, p.391]). But that example is very implausible. These theories are
formulated in quite distinct languages,4 and they cannot be seen as literally ex-
tending a common core of the membership relation. Obviously, the theories
must have something in common, but to claim that they are precisely the same
in some rather undetermined part is unreasonable.
More than that: notice that the apparatus of quasi-truth is performing no
essential job in this strategy. A classical logician may also restrict her interest
to a class of consistent theorems of the naive set theory and reconstruct the
theory in a consistent way. That throws no light on the inconsistent original
theory’s truth or quasi-truth. Nothing is made of the Russell contradiction in
the original theory. Why is Cantorian set theory said to be quasi-true, given
that it is trivial? No explanation is given. The classical logician seems even
to have an advantage. There is an explanation for why such re-constructions
are pursued: because they are admittedly consistent. Cantor’s theory is trivial,
and must be fixed. No need for quasi-truth. Something similar may be said
4As it is known, NF and ML require a stratification procedure in the language (a kind of typified
language), where formulas must obey some constraints in order to be well-formed. This does not
happen in ZFC or NBG. NBG, on its turn, allows for a distinction between classes and sets, which
ZFC and NF do not. Many other differences in language and in the theories themselves could be
pointed ou. The reader is referred to Fraenkel, Bar-Hillel and Levy for a very useful introductory
account [12]).
13
of Frege’s arithmetic. The development of Frege’s theorem indicates that the
inconsistency may be eliminated, and arithmetic developed in a second order
logic with Hume’s Principle (Zalta [18]). No need to say that the original theory
is quasi-true.
From these discussion, it results that the claim by Bueno and da Costa [5,
p.391] seems unjustified:
As a result, the partial structures approach provides the right sort of
framework to examine issues regarding inconsistency in science. In
terms of the approach, it’s possible to represent, without triviality,
inconsistent theories as being quasi-true.
As we noticed, the quasi-truth approach does not represent contradictions, and
the strategy employed to deal with inconsistent theories does not appeal to
quasi-truth.
4 Interpreting quasi-truth
So far, we have argued that the traditional definition of quasi-truth does not de-
liver what was promised, that is, an account of incomplete knowledge, which
may also account for inconsistencies in science.
What can we do with the formalism of quasi-truth? Here, we shall argue
that the quasi-truth approach provides for a model of a very restricted class of
situations.
What we have in mind is the contextual approach to inconsistency de-
fended by Brown in [2], and critically discussed by da Costa and French [8,
chap.5]. In a nutshell, according to Brown, some inconsistent theories are not
to be accepted as true when taken as a whole. We accept the theory on some
contextual limits, avoiding to bring into each context incompatible claims. As
da Costa and French [8, p.88] comment, the plan consists in breaking the in-
consistent theory into sub-contexts where the incompatible principles are not
brought into play together.5 So, if a theory somehow endorses both a propo-
sition α and its negation ¬α, we break it into a context where α is accepted,
and in another context, where ¬α is accepted. We never apply the theory using
both α and ¬α (this interpretation of quasi-truth, as a case of a paraconsistent
treatment of contradictions, was also advanced in Arenhart [1]).
This approach is best illustrated by the example of the Bohr ‘model’ of the
atom (as discussed by Brown [2]). It is widely accepted that the model involved
some tensions between classical and quantum principles, and the theory is
frequently cited as a case of inconsistent theory. However, as Brown argues,
the inconsistent principles are never applied together. On Bohr’s model, an
electron in a Hydrogen atom is always in some discrete orbit, which form its
so-called stationary states. In these cases, classical mechanics is employed to
account for the dynamics of the electron in the stationary state it finds itself
5Later, these consistent fragments of the theory where termed “chunks” — see below.
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in. When, however, one wishes to account for the transition of the electron
between the distinct discrete stationary states, quantum principles are called
for, Planck’s formula giving the relation between the amount of energy and
frequency of radiation emitted.
As a result of such a confinement, no real contradiction obtains. Classical
principles hold in one context; quantum principles in another.6 Although da
Costa and French [8, p.89] are rather critical of Brown’s approach,7 we believe
that the formal apparatus of quasi-truth is a model of precisely this kind of
situation, where distinct contexts are applied in order to accommodate incom-
patible sentences. In order to see why, consider the informal discussion of a
modal logic of quasi-truth, as discussed by da Costa [7, pp.135-136]. Given a
partial structure A, the A-normal structures extending A may be seen as possi-
ble worlds in a Kripke semantics for S5. A sentence is quasi-true in A if there is
a world where it is true. A sentence is strictly valid if it is true in every world.
Then, obviously, each world (i.e., A-normal structure) operates as a context,
completely classical, where no contradiction is admitted. Of course, a sentence
may be quasi-true, and its negation too, but in distinct possible worlds. This
captures the idea of a confining of consistent principles in a context.8
The main problem with this approach, as da Costa and French [8, p.89] see
it in their criticism of Brown, is that it has rather limited application, given
that it is not clear that every inconsistent theory will allow for such a divi-
sion into consistent contexts. However, that criticism applies to the quasi-truth
approach also, due to its relation to the Kripke semantics of S5, as briefly dis-
cussed above, and, which is equivalent to the fact already discussed that a
sentence in the form of α ∧ ¬α is never quasi-true, so that such a contradiction
must be broken in two contexts, one verifying α, another one verifying ¬α.
In this interpretation, then, quasi-truth is not about incompleteness and in-
consistency, but rather, more pragmatically, about assuming incompatible sets
of commitments according to our needs. Distinct total structures represent the
commitments one temporarily has assumed to account for a given context. This
has a much less ambitious aim than the one originally proposed by da Costa
and French [8], but it is, we believe, closer to what the formalism really presents
us with.
As a further minor remark, this interpretation also points to another inade-
6This is precisely what we meant above in mentioning complementarity. There is a “rationale”
for such a procedure by means of paraclassical logic; these are non-adjunctive logics where we can
have two propositions α (say, A) and β (say, ¬A) but not their conjunction α ∧ β (a contradiction).
Furthermore, due to its typical concept of deduction, from two contradictory theses we cannot
derive any proposition, that is, the logic is not trivial; see da Costa and Krause [9], [10].
7Later, Brown has improved his ideas in several papers, until the 2004 paper with Priest [3]
introducing the “chunk and permeate” technique which, roughly speaking, consists in separating
logically consistent “chunks” in a theory and study the kinds of information can “permeate” from
one chunk to another without conducing to trivialization. For a general explanation and references,
see M. Friend and M.del R. Martínez-Ordaz [13] and, of course, [3].
8The discussion here could go to deeper levels. In [11], da Costa, Bueno and French discussed
“the logic of pragmatic truth”, arguing that is consist of a kind of modal non-adjunctive logic,
called Jas´kowski’s discussive logic, which is grounded on S5. But our sketch takes the minimal
points.
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quacy of the typical rendering of the formalism of the pragmatic truth: the idea
that scientific knowledge progresses or improves by choosing this or that fill-
ing of gaps in our knowledge (that is, by a choice of this or that total structure).
However, the real problem, as it happened in the case of the Bohr model, is not
that we are ignorant of total structure should we choose (classical mechanics
or quantum principles), but rather, we are asked to provide for a new, unifying
framework which accounts for both situations under the same set of principles
(which the ‘new’ quantum theory of Heisenberg and Schrödinger did). Then,
while this temporary use of incompatible information in distinct contexts may
be accommodated by our interpretation of quasi-truth, the interpretation also
allows us to remark that unification of incompatible models is what is typically
sought.
5 Concluding remarks
Quasi-truth, as a framework advanced to accommodate more realistically the
actual vicissitudes of science, was part of a highly ambitious plan on the phi-
losophy of science. We have argued that on what concerns accommodation of
incompleteness and inconsistency in science, the approach falls short of deliv-
ering the promised goods. Let us review shortly what was achieved.
On what concerns the definition of quasi-truth advanced directly by da
Costa and collaborators, it is implausible to claim that incompleteness is ac-
commodated by the framework. If one considers that a sentence is quasi-true
in a structure A with relation to a A-normal structure B, then, incompleteness
reduces to the possibility of choosing between distinct complete models (A-
normal structures) where a sentence may be false or true in the Tarskian sense.
This is just the same situation as in the classical case, and no real gain is ob-
tained by this approach. The incompleteness is not codified in the language
of the framework, it is an extra-systematic issue. However, when one adopts
the other two definitions of quasi-true (definitions II and III), then, it seems,
the mark of incompleteness in the approach consists in the fact that a sentence
may be quasi-true, while its negation may also be quasi-true in some pragmatic
structure. However, we have argued, this is the wrong path to incompleteness,
because a contradiction (true or quasi-true) may be better understood as repre-
senting excess of information, not lack of information. We have contrasted this
paraconsistent approach with the paracomplete approaches, which we believe
better capture lack of information.
When it comes to deal with contradictions and inconsistency, quasi-truth
seems to fail again. The fact is that even though a sentence and its negation
may be both quasi-true, they are quasi-true in distinct normal structures. A
parametrization strategy accounts for the apparent contradiction. As we have
discussed, this is not an account of contradictions (see also Arenhart [1]). Also,
a contradiction of the form α ∧ ¬α cannot be quasi-true; however, this is pre-
cisely what one needs in order to account for most cases of internally inconsis-
tent theories.
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Finally, we have advanced a more modest reading of the formal apparatus
of quasi-truth as a kind of contextualization process. Quasi-truth models the
workings of sentences in distinct contexts, with a common core of sentences.
Perhaps this idea can be associated with the Chunk and Permeate technique,
something to be pursued further, although we still are not able to fully under-
stand the criteria the proponents use to get the chunks and which kind of “in-
formation” can pass from one chunk to another. The suggestion by da Costa [7]
according to which one may interpret quasi-truth in possible world semantics
for S5 gave further evidence to the plausibility of this interpretation (paraclas-
sical logic could be used here as an alternative). In this (ours) interpretation,
there are no contradictions or incompleteness accommodated, but it is possible
to make sense of the formalism in realistic situations, in which distinct sets of
assumptions are held in distinct contexts, perhaps for distinct purposes. If this
does not carry forward the program initiated by da Costa and collaborators, at
least it provides for a much more plausible understanding of the formalism, it
seems to us.
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